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政府激勵(lì)機(jī)制下新能源技術(shù)發(fā)展三方演化博弈分析

來(lái)源:電工電氣發(fā)布時(shí)間:2024-08-01 15:01瀏覽次數(shù):284

政府激勵(lì)機(jī)制下新能源技術(shù)發(fā)展三方演化博弈分析

周路遙,劉富州,袁博文,陸宇軒,吳天雄
(國(guó)網(wǎng)江蘇省電力有限公司鹽城供電分公司,江蘇 鹽城 224000)
 
    摘 要:伴隨著參與電力市場(chǎng)的主體類型數(shù)量逐漸上升,經(jīng)典的優(yōu)化理論與常規(guī)博弈模型已經(jīng)很難解決受多種因素影響的多主體行為決策模型。針對(duì)目前市場(chǎng)環(huán)境下新能源發(fā)電商與火力發(fā)電商的集中競(jìng)價(jià)行為,建立了競(jìng)爭(zhēng)型代理模式下的三主體演化博弈模型。以參與博弈的主體有限理性以及市場(chǎng)化環(huán)境下有限信息,通過(guò)理論推導(dǎo)出了各主體在不同階段、不同政策下的最優(yōu)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)策略,通過(guò)算例分析了發(fā)電商和政府部門的演化結(jié)果、策略應(yīng)對(duì)以及其中影響決策的主要因素,驗(yàn)證了演化博弈在市場(chǎng)背景下多主體最優(yōu)策略分析中的有效性,并為發(fā)電側(cè)主體的行為和政府部門的政策提供了建議。
    關(guān)鍵詞: 發(fā)電競(jìng)價(jià);發(fā)電側(cè);演化博弈;多群體策略均衡
    中圖分類號(hào):F206 ;TM61     文獻(xiàn)標(biāo)識(shí)碼:A     文章編號(hào):1007-3175(2024)07-0001-10
 
The Analysis of Tripartite Evolutionary Game of New Energy Technology
Development Under the Government Incentive Mechanism
 
ZHOU Lu-yao, LIU Fu-zhou, YUAN Bo-wen, LU Yu-xuan, WU Tian-xiong
(State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co., Ltd. Yancheng Power Supply Company, Yancheng 224000, China)
 
    Abstract: With the gradual increase of the number of entities participating in the electricity market, it was difficult for classical optimization theory and classic game model to solve the multi-agent behavior decision-making model affected by multiple factors. In view of the centralized bidding behavior of new energy power generators and thermal power generators in the current market environment, a three-subject evolutionary game model under the competitive agency model was established. Based on the limited rationality of the subjects participating in the game and the limited information in the market-oriented environment, the optimal competition strategy of each subject in different stages and different policies were theoretically deduced. This paper analyzes the evolution results, strategic responses and the main factors affecting the decision-making of power generators and government departments through examples, it verifies the effectiveness of evolutionary game in the analysis of multi-agent optimal strategies in the market context, provides suggestions for the behavior of generation side and the policies of government departments.
    Key words: power generation bidding; generation side; evolutionary game; multi-group strategy equilibrium
 
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