基于演化博弈的日前市場(chǎng)發(fā)電側(cè)競(jìng)價(jià)演化穩(wěn)定性分析
李昕儒1，劉傳清2，仲佳佳2，張潮2，陸堯3
（1 南京三新供電服務(wù)有限公司浦口分公司，江蘇 南京 211800；2 南京工程學(xué)院 電力工程學(xué)院，江蘇 南京 211167；
3 南京祿口空港新城建設(shè)發(fā)展有限公司，江蘇 南京 211113）
摘 要：隨著電力現(xiàn)貨市場(chǎng)售電側(cè)的開放程度逐漸擴(kuò)大，發(fā)電商直接參與售電，通過(guò)競(jìng)價(jià)上網(wǎng)參與市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。根據(jù)發(fā)電商發(fā)電規(guī)模的差異，應(yīng)用演化博弈中的多群體復(fù)制動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型對(duì)發(fā)電商的競(jìng)價(jià)策略進(jìn)行建模，利用雅可比矩陣討論模型的均衡點(diǎn)和穩(wěn)定性，并結(jié)合政府監(jiān)管方對(duì)競(jìng)價(jià)結(jié)果的影響，定量分析參數(shù)的變化對(duì)演化穩(wěn)定的影響。仿真結(jié)果表明，多群體復(fù)制動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型能較充分地反映出發(fā)電商競(jìng)價(jià)的動(dòng)態(tài)過(guò)程，并反映發(fā)電商在面對(duì)不同的政府調(diào)控措施下的報(bào)價(jià)策略，只有合理的競(jìng)價(jià)規(guī)則才能保證用電用戶獲得價(jià)格低廉的電力，并保證發(fā)電商自身的利益。
關(guān)鍵詞：日前市場(chǎng)；演化博弈論；發(fā)電商；競(jìng)價(jià)策略
中圖分類號(hào)：F407.6；TM73 文獻(xiàn)標(biāo)識(shí)碼：A 文章編號(hào)：1007-3175(2020)10-0008-05
Evolutionary Stability Analysis of Generation Side Bidding in Day-Ahead Market
Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
LI Xin-ru1, LIU Chuan-qing2, ZHONG Jia-jia2, ZHANG Chao2, LU Yao3
（1 Pukou Branch of Nanjing Sanxin Power Supply Service Co., Ltd, Nanjing 211800, China;
2 School of Electric Power Engineering, Nanjing Institute of Technology, Nanjing 21116 7, China;
3 Nanjing Lukou International Airport New Town Construction & Development Co., Ltd, Nanjing 211113 , China）
Abstract: With the gradual expansion of the opening degree of the electricity selling side of the spot electricity market, the power producers directly participate in the electricity sales and participate in the market competition through bidding.Considering that power generation companies expect to achieve profit maximization through the optimal bidding strategy. According to the difference of power generation scale, the multi group replication dynamic game model in evolutionary game is applied to model the bidding strategy of power generation companies. Using Jacobian matrix to discuss the equilibrium point and stability of the model, combined with the influence of government regulators on the bidding results, quantitative analysis of the impact of parameter changes on evolutionary stability.Only reasonable bidding rules can ensure that power consumers can obtain low-cost electricity and ensure the interests of power producers.Simulation results show that multiple population copy dynamic game model can fully reflect the dynamic process of electricity bidding, and to reflect electricity generators in the face of the bidding strategies under different government regulation and control measures, only reasonable bidding rules can ensure that power consumers can obtain low-cost electricity, and guarantee the generation company's own interests.
Key words: day-ahead market; evolutionary game theory; power generation company; bidding strategy
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